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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A SURVEY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE LEGISLATION
IN THE STATES
I. INTRODUCTION
In April of 1993, Irma Hunter Brown, an African-American Arkansas
representative, who lives near a toxic waste facility, convinced the Arkansas
legislature to enact the first state law on environmental equity and justice.'
The "Environmental Equity Act' 2 seeks to prevent the concentration of
solid waste disposal facilities in lower income and minority communities.3
The environmental justice movement seeks to combat distributional
inequities of environmental protection4 by prohibiting the construction of
new facilities unless they meet certain criteria.' It has gathered force in
recent years because of a growing recognition that low income and
minority communities are disproportionately burdened by environmental
hazards.6 The movement has also gained strength because studies have
found that these same communities receive less governmental protection
and experience slower governmental responses to environmental dangers
than non-minority communities.7
While several commentators have explored the effectiveness of
1. William Claiborne, More Nonwhites Are Living Near Toxic Waste Sites; Racial Disparities
Have Grown Despite National Focus on Issue, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1994, at A17.
2. Siting High Impact Solid Waste Management Facilities Act of Apr. 20, 1993, No. 1263
(codified at ARK. CODE ANN. 8-6-1501-1504 (Michie 1993)).
3. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-6-1501(b) states:
The General Assembly also acknowledges that, while solid waste management facilities are
essential, certain types of facilities impose specific burdens on the host community. National
trends indicate a tendency to concentrate high impact solid waste disposal facilities in lower
income or minority communities. Such facilities may place an onus on the host community
without any reciprocal benefits to local residents. The purpose of this subchapter is to prevent
communities from becoming involuntary hosts to a proliferation of high impact solid waste
management facilities.
4. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing Environmental Justice: The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 N.W. L. REV. 787, 824 (1993).
5. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 9-24 and accompanying text.
7. Id.
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combatting environmental injustice through the judicial system,8 this
Recent Development argues that states should pursue environmental justice
through legislation that regulates the siting of toxic and hazardous waste
facilities. Part H briefly explores the mounting evidence that environmental
injustice exists. Part I outlines the current state approaches to a siting of
hazardous waste facilities and the resulting distributional equity or inequity.
Part IV analyzes the siting approach adopted by the Arkansas legislature
and compares this statute to other legislative schemes currently under
consideration in other states. Finally, Part V proposes a model state act that
will best achieve environmental equity for current and future generations.
II. EVIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL INEQUITY
In 1983, the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted the first study
on environmental racism.9 The GAO examined hazardous waste landfills
in eight southeastern states that comprise the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) Region IV. It found that African-Americans constituted a
majority of the population in three of the four communities hosting
landfills."0 Although the study showed that a positive correlation between
the racial composition of these communities and the location of hazardous
landfills, its narrow scope has prevented others from generalizing about the
study's results."
Consequently, in 1987, the United Church of Christ Commission for
Racial Justice (UCC) conducted a far more comprehensive study of
environmental racism. 2 The report concluded that although socio-
8. See, e.g., James Colopy, The Road less Travelled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 125 (1994); Lazarus, supra note 4, at
827-42 (advocacy Title VI challenge).
9. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR
CORRELATION WrmI RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983).
10. Id. at 4. African-Americans made up 52%, 66%, and 90% of the population in those three
communities. The General Accounting Office (GAO) also found that between 26% and 42% of the
population in the four host communities lived below the poverty level. •
11. Id. at 13.
The GAO study, while important, was limited by its regional scope. It was not designed to
examine the relationship between the location of hazardous waste facilities throughout the
United States and the racial and socio-economic characteristics of persons residing near them.
Nor, prior to our current report, had there been a study to ascertain whether the GAO finding
was indicative of any national patterns.
Id.
12. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE
IN THE UNITED STATES (1987). The Commission's study purported to conduct two cross-sectional,
nationwide studies to determine the extent to which African-Americans, as well as other minority
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economic status had a positive correlation with the location of hazardous
waste facilities, race constituted a more significant factor. 3 Even after
accounting for urbanization and regional differences, a higher correlation
between race and the location of hazardous waste facilities remained. 4
Due to the enormous publicity and subsequent controversy arising from
the UCC and GAO studies, the EPA formed an intra-agency group to
evaluate agency policies from an environmental equity perspective. t5 In
1992, this "Environment and Equity" working group produced a report 6
that acknowledged that minorities experience greater exposure to certain
pollutants. 7 However, it did not recognize the existence of a clear
connection between race and environmental hazards. The report concluded
that the EPA needed to gather more data on the environmental health
effects experienced by different racial and socio-economic groups.18
But, in contrast to the EPA study, a 1992 study by the National Law
Journal not only found a clear nexus between race and environmental
hazards, but also uncovered less protective environmental cleanup and less
groups, were exposed to hazardous wastes in their communities. Id. at ix.
13. Id. at xiii - xiv. The studies examined demographic patterns associated with commercial
hazardous waste facilities and uncontrolled toxic waste sites. Id. at xiii. In studying the demographic
characteristics of communities with commercial hazardous waste facilities, the studies revealed that
communities containing two or more facilities or one of the nation's five largest landfills, had on
average, a minority population that exceeded the minority population in communities without facilities
(38% vs. 12%). Id.
The study determined that "three out of the five largest commercial hazardous waste landfills in the
United States were located in predominantly [African-American] or Hispanic communities. These three
landfills comprised 40% of the total estimated commercial landfill capacity in the nation." Id. at xiv.
The studies' examination of communities with uncontrolled toxic waste sites found, among other
things, that "three out of every five [African-Americans] and Hispanic Americans lived in communities
with uncontrolled toxic waste sites." Id.
14. Id.
15. See Lazarus, supra note 4, at 803. In response to the UCC and GAO findings, a group of
academics and government officials held a conference in 1990 at the University of Michigan to discuss
emerging environmental justice concerns. Id. The participants convinced EPA Administrator William
K Reilly to establish an EPA committee to audit the agency's policies from an environmental justice
perspective. Id. at 803-04.
16. ENVIL. EQUITY WORKGROUP, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. EPA,
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, WORKGROUP REPORT To THE
ADMINISTRATOR (June 1992).
17. Id. at 13-14. The report cited four causes ofgreater minority exposure: 1) larger concentration
of minorities in urban areas where emission densities tend to be greatest; 2) physical proximity of
minority populations to hazardous waste sites; 3) minority consumption of contaminated food; and 4)
minority farmworker exposure to pesticides. Id.
18. Id. at 11.
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stringent environmental enforcement efforts in minority communities.' 9
Most recently, the Center for Policy Alternatives, the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the United
Church of Christ released a report updating the 1987 UCC study.20 The
report concluded that environmental racism has worsened. For example, it
found that minorities were forty-seven percent more likely than caucasians
to live near a toxic waste site in 1993. Additionally, it noted that the
percentage of minorities residing adjacent to toxic waste dumps increased
from twenty-five percent in 1980 to nearly thirty-one percent in 1993.2
In response to public pressure arising out of these reports, the Clinton
Administration issued an Executive Order in February of 1994 directing all
federal agencies to address environmental justice in minority and low
income populations.' The Order calls for the creation of an Interagency
Working Group on Environmental Justice to organize and coordinate
agency activities.'
In summary, although conclusive proof does not exist, sufficient evidence
suggests that low income and minority communities bear a
disproportionately higher burden of environmental hazards.24 Completely
redressing these inequities would require broad social changes in race and
19. Marianne Lavelle, The Minorities Equation Race and Income: Variations on a Trend, NAT'L
L.J, Sept. 21, 1992, at S2. The study analyzed enforcement and waste statistics from civil enforcement
cases on the EPA's Civil Enforcement Docket. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection:
The Racial Divide in Environmental law, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 21, 1992, at SI. The study found race more
significant than income in relation to fines and to the speed with which cleanup is initiated and
completed. Id. Specifically, the study revealed that under all federal environmental laws targeting air,
water, and waste pollution, penalties in predominately caucasian communities were 46 percent higher
than in minority communities. Id. The average fine under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
was $335,566 in the areas with the greatest caucasian population compared to $55,318 in the areas with
the greatest minority population. Id.
20. Enviro Justice: Report Finds Problem Has Got Worse, GREENWIRE, Aug. 25, 1994, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire File. The study analyzed 530 commercial hazardous waste facilities
using 1990 U.S. census data updated to 1993. Id.
21. Id. Charles Lee, the Director of the 1987 UCC Report, stated that the new study indicates"...
a need for greater state involvement in buffering residents from the hazards of toxic sites." Id.
22. Executive Order No. 12,898,49 C.F.R. 170 (1994). See also Gary Lee, EPA: Clinton Executive
Order Gives Boost to Mission, WASH. PoST, Feb. 17, 1994, at A21. The Executive Order requires
federal agencies to determine whether their regulations adversely affect minorities or low income
individuals. It also directs federal agencies to ensure that states or other organizations receiving federal
funding for environmental projects do not violate federal civil rights laws. EPA Administrator Carol M.
Browner has ordered EPA' general counsel to review agency regulations to determine whether they
further environmental justice. Id.
23. Executive Order No. 12,898.
24. See supra notes 9-21 and accbmpanying text.
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class relations. In the short term, however, state legislatures can try to solve
the problem of distributional inequity by ensuring that waste facilities are
sited in an equitable and non-discriminatory manner. The following section
outlines the various approaches to state siting of waste facilities and the
consequences of each from an environmental justice viewpoint.
III. CURRENT APPROACHES
State siting refers to the process of locating a hazardous waste facility.
Four types of state siting approaches exist: super review, site designation,
local control, or compensation.
A. Super Review Approach
The super review approach is the most commonly used state siting
mechanism.' Under this approach, the prospective waste facility develop-
er chooses a site and then applies to the state regulatory agency for a
permit. 6 The agency evaluates the permit application according to criteria
that vary from state to state. 7 In general, however, the agency will
examine the facility's environmental impact and overall effect on the
community. If the agency accepts the application, it passes it on to a
special review board for further consideration.28 These boards are usually
composed of experts as well as local representatives.29
The super review approach attempts to reach a fair result during the
siting process by providing informed debate among the experts on the siting
board.3" It also enables local community members to participate in the
decision-making. However, the super review model fails to ensure
25. For a detailed discussion of state hazardous waste programs using the super review approach
see Rodolfo Mata, Hazardous Waste Facilities and Environmental Equity: A Proposed Siting Model,
13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 375, 401-05 (1994); Brain D.E. Canter, Hazardous Waste Disposal and the New
State Siting Programs, 14 NAT. RESOURCEs LAW. 421, 438-443 (1982); Rachel D. Godsil, Note,
Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394, 403-408 (1991).
26. Godsil, supra note 25, at 403.
27. Id. at 404. Indiana, for example, requires developers to delineate the hydrogeological
characteristics of the site as well as complete an environmental assessment and engineering plan. Id.
Wisconsin, on the other hand, requires the developer to wait until the Department of Natural Resources
has examined the site and determined its suitability in terms of topography, soils, geography, and
hydrogeology. Id. Some states consider the effects of the site on the community as well. For example,
Michigan assesses a site's impact on the scenic, historic, and recreational aspects of the area. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. Experts include geologists, chemical engineers, academics, and state agency employees.
Local representatives include anyone else representing the district. Id.
30. Canter, supra note 25, at 449.
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environmental equity for two reasons. First, state siting statutes that use this
approach often contain preemption clauses that allow the Board to make a
decision contrary to the wishes of the affected community." Consequent-
ly, the siting board can still ignore local opposition if it so chooses.
Second, this approach allows the developer to choose the proposed site.
Naturally, developers have an economic incentive to choose sites with
lower land values. Those sites are typically located in poor communities,
especially poor, minority communities.32 Moreover, even when local land
use laws preempt state siting statutes, more affluent communities can
oppose a plan through litigation, political pressure, or civil disobedience.33
Thus, in order to prevent delays and minimize expenses, developers
ultimately pursue sites in the communities least able to muster opposi-
tion.34
B. Site Designation
Under the site designation approach, the state, not the developers,
compels a list of potential sites. 5 States utilizing this approach generally
utilize a procedure in which affected local communities can communicate
with the state regulatory authorities throughout the decision-making
process.36 On its face, site designation appears superior to super review
because the state is better equipped to take a comprehensive view of site
distribution and less likely to focus on profit.37
However, site designation also has problems. Politicians representing
31. Id. at 450.
32. Godsil, supra note 25, at 399-400. African-Americans are more burdened by environmental
risks because of segregated housing patterns. Id. at 399. Also, more so than African-Americans, poor
caucasians tend to live in economically varied areas that benefit from the political clout of the middle
class. Id. Conversely, black people are often concentrated in poverty areas. Id. Moreover, as a rule,
caucasians are reluctant to move into a neighborhood that has a 20% African-American population. Id.
at 400. Thus, these already poorer areas have a smaller pool of potential buyers, lowering housing prices
and land values even further. Id. Lower land values are attractive to hazardous waste facility developers.
Id.
33. Id. at 405.
34. Id.
35. Canter, supra note 25, at 443. Minnesota, Massachusetts, and Maryland utilize this approach.
Their programs contain a common regulatory objective: to designate preferred sites for the construction
of waste facilities prior to project proposals. Id.
36. Id. at 444-448. In Minnesota, for example, a resident from each host community serves as a
temporary board member. Id. at 445. Maryland holds a public hearing in the area of the proposed site
before the board makes a final decision on the certificate application. Id. at 444.
37. But cf. Mata, supra note 25, at 412 (arguing that states, just like private developers, are
attracted to inexpensive property in order to make the most cost-effective use of limited resources).
[VOL. 73:1459
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more affluent and influential communities can lobby the agency to remove
their districts from the site list.38 In addition, in states such as Maryland
where counties must designate suitable sites, the counties may purposely
submit unsuitable sites or sites located within politically powerless
communities.39 This lessens the likelihood that the government will select
a more affluent county as a site or at least ensures that any facility sited
within the county will be located in a politically powerless community.4 °
C. Local Control
Few states utilize the local control approach.4 Under this model, state
siting statutes do not preempt local land use regulations.4' As a result, a
local government can create narrow land use regulations to block the siting
of facilities within its borders. This approach encourages the "Not in My
Back Yard" (NIMBY) syndrome.43 Thus, if a state requires a facility's
siting, it must provide incentives to coax a local community into accepting
the location. Lower income communities often need the benefits of state
incentive programs. Thus, facilities often locate in less affluent areas.
D. Compensation Approach
In order to eliminate local opposition to sitings, some states have
incorporated compensation schemes into their siting laws.' Compensation
schemes attempt to redress the injustice inflicted up on communities
required to cope with the burden of a waste facility. However, compensa-
tion programs can vary in several significant ways. First, compensation may
serve as a remedy, a preventative measure, or a reward.45 Second,
compensation programs can differ as to timing. A community may receive
compensation prior to the facility's construction, on an on-going basis, or
38. Godsil, supra note 25, at 406. (acknowledging the suggestion of other syndromes that may
work against the pursuit of environmental equity including "Not In My Term Of Office" (NIMTOF)
and "Not In My Election Year" (NIMEY)).
39. Id.
40. Mata, supra note 25, at 411.
41. These states are Florida and California. See Godsil, supra note 25, at 406-07.
42. Id. at 406.
43. Id. at 407. "Not in My Back yard" (NIMBY) is a popular acronym that refers to the public's
opposition to the siting of undesirable land uses such as hazardous waste facilities. Id.
44. For an in-depth discussion of compensated siting proposals, see Vicki Been, Compensated
Siting Proposals: Is it Time to Pay Attention?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 788-96 (1994).
45. Id. at 792.
1995] 1465
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after the facility causes some harm.46 Finally, compensation programs can
differ as to the amount of compensation offered. Compensation may be
determined by state statute, a state agency, or the parties themselves.47
Thus, compensation systems may not effectively compensate a community
fobi its waste facility costs.
A compensation scheme has other problems as well. Some environmental
justice advocates have voiced moral "objections to compensation for
environmental hazards.48 Others assert that compensation programs will
ultimately fail because safety is not a negotiable issue.49 One commentator
has outlined four major questions regarding compensation proposals that
require further exploration by those interested in environmental justice. °
First, do compensation schemes subject to the marketplace matters such as
health and safety, that should not be bought or sold." Second, because
low-income communities are highly susceptible to accepting compensation
programs, will such programs then lead to further distributional inequity
and unfair treatment of the poor?52 Third, do compensation programs
allow a community to enjoy the short-term economic rewards at the
46. Id. at 792-94. Compensation prior to a facility's construction generally takes the form ofgrants
enabling communities to hire independent experts to evaluate the proposed facility. Id. at 793. Ongoing
compensation may include special taxes or fees paid by the facility to the community, or services the
facility provides the community such as jobs, boosts to the economy, or charitable contributions. Id.
Compensation after the facility causes harm to the community is usually remedial in nature. Id. at 792.
For example, it may require a developer to clean up existing waste sites in the community in exchange
for permission to construct the new facility. Id. at 793.
47. Id. at 794-95.
48. See, e.g., ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY (1990).
49. Been, supra note 44, at 788 (citing Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing In the Siting of
Hazardous and Radioactive Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68
TUL. L. REV. 1047 (1994)); Bradford C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon and Siting and Cleaning tip
of Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Mediation Slay the Monster?, 19. B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 239, 275 (1991).
50. Id. at 824-26. Compensated siting proposals are widespread and here to stay for the foreseeable
future. Id. at 824. Thus, the environmental justice movement must examine these proposals and
formulate a more thoughtful and comprehensive position regarding such programs. Id.
51. Id. at 824-25. Been questions whether certain matters should not be traded on the market. Id.
For example, society prohibits people from selling their kidneys to the highest bidder. Id. For a further
discussion about whether certain rights should not be traded on the market, see Seth F. Kreimer,
Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293,
1389-90 (1984); Margaret J. Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1903-37 (1987);
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931
(1985).
52. Been, supra note 44, at 824.
[VOL. 73:1459
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expense of the health of future generations?53 Finally, because compensa-
tion programs are immoral unless entered into voluntarily, the parameters
of such "voluntary" agreements must be delineated. 4
To date, traditional state siting approaches have failed to produce
environmentally equitable results. For this reason, environmental justice
advocates in several states are now pressuring legislators to reform state
siting processes to account for the distributional inequities inherent in
present siting approaches.
IV. ARKANSAS' ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY ACT
Act 1263 of 19935 is the first and most substantive "environmental
equity" legislation passed in the nation. 6 The Act creates a rebuttable
presumption against permitting57 the construction or operation of a high
impact, solid waste management facility" within twelve miles of an
existing high impact solid waste management facility.5 9 The Department
of Pollution Control and Ecology, the regional or service area solid waste
planning board, and any other governmental body possessing the authority
to grant or zone jurisdiction over a facility, must honor this presumption. 0
But, a prospective owner can rebut the presumption by showing that no
other suitable site exists in the region because of geographical constraints
53. Id. at 825. For a discussion of the nature of our obligation to future generations see Daniel A.
Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and
the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267, 289-300 (1993).
54. Been, supra note 44, at 825 (questioning whether an agreement is truly voluntary if
communities are ignorant, relative to site developers, of the risks and harms the facility will impose).
55, Siting High Impact Solid Waste Management Facilities Act of Apr. 20, 1993, No. 1263
(codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-6-1501-1504 (Michie 1993)).
56. AtK. CODE ANN. § 8-6-1501(b) (Michie 1993). In the Act's section on legislative intent, the
General Assembly explicitly states that it enacted this section in response to the proliferation of solid
waste disposal facilities in lower income and minority communities. See supra note 3 and accompany-
ing text.
57. "'Permitting' means any governmental authorization to proceed with construction or operation
of a facility or activity required by either state law or local ordinance." ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-6-1502(2)
(Michie 1993).
58. A "high impact solid waste management facility" is "any solid waste landfill, any solid or
commercial hazardous waste incinerator, and any commercial hazardous waste treatment, storage or
disposal facility." Id. at § 8-6-1502(l)(A).
This definition does not include "(i) recycling or composting facilities; (ii) waste tire management
sites; (iii) solid waste transfer stations; or (iv) solid waste landfills which have applications pending for
either increased or new acreage or provisions for additional services or increased capacity." Id. at § 8-6-
1502(l)(B).
59, Id. at § 8-6-1504(aX1).
60. Id. at § 8-6-1504(a)(2).
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or that the host community6 has accepted the siting in return for certain
incentives.6' These incentives may include increased employment opportu-
nities, reasonable host fees, contributions to the community infrastructure,
compensation to any adjacent landowners, or the subsidization of local
community service.63 The Department of Pollution Control and Ecology
can not process those permit applications subject to the rebuttable
presumption until the affected community authorities have issued definitive
findings regarding the necessary conditions for the permit.64
A. Comparison to Other Legislative Proposals65
1. State Legislation
Besides Arkansas, four states have enacted environmental justice
legislation.66 However, each of these statutes generally does nothing more
than mandate some form of information gathering and analysis. Florida67
requires the creation of an Environmental Equity and Justice Commission
to examine the distribution of environmental hazards and to assess and
make recommendations as to how Florida can best address any environ-
mental inequities found.68
61. "Host community" means "all governmental units possessing zoning authority encompassed
within a twelve-mile radius of the site of a proposed high impact solid waste management facility." Id.
at § 8-6-1502(3).
62. The Act does not address who decides whether the presumption has been adequately rebutted.
63. ARK. CODE ANN. 8-6-1504(b)(2)(A)-(E).
64. Id. at § 8-6-1503.
65. For a general description of state environmental justice legislation and legislative proposals,
see BARTON HACKER, CENTER FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LEGISLATION
IN TE STATES (Barbara Butler ed., 1994).
66. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
67. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.85 (West 1994).
68. Id. The commission is required to submit a report by December 31, 1995 that includes I) a
listing of the major targeted sites, with past and current demographic information, including health
statistics of the surrounding population; 2) a review of past enforcement actions; 3) review of factors,
including economic factors, that may have caused the concentration of sites; 4) a review of state
statutes, rules, and policies, and a review of the role played by state, regional, and local governmental
entities in siting and land use decisions; 5) a review of data and methodologies which can increase
awareness of neighborhoods with high risk for health effects; 6) a review of enforcement statutes and
rules; 7) a review of government efforts at every level to ensure equitable representation of minority
and low income communities in the government work force; 8) a review of EPA methods used to
communicate with minority and low income communities; 9) a review of approaches to ensure
consideration of environmental equity issues when formulating agency policies; and 10) an analysis of
the creation of a permanent institutional review entity to deal with environmental equity. Id.
For a further discussion of the statute, see Hacker, supra note 65, at 5 (noting that the Florida
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss3/34
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Similarly, Louisiana law requires the state to hold at least three fact-
finding hearings to gather facts and obtain comments concerning environ-
mental equity.69 But, as of August 24, 1994, the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) had simply completed the hearings process
and issued a Report which included several recommendations regarding
legislation, funding, and DEQ reporting.7"
Tennessee and Virginia both passed House Joint Resolutions concerning
environmental equity. Tennessee requires the Commissioners of Health and
Environment to analyze a hypothetical Environmental Justice Act patterned
after federal legislation.7' The most significant aspect of the hypothetical
act requires a moratorium on new facilities when a significant adverse
effect on human health is disclosed in high impact areas.72 Virginia
requires a review commission to study the siting, monitoring, and clean-up
of solid and hazardous waste facilities, emphasizing their impact on
minority communities."
legislation passed with little opposition due to the fact that it mandated only information gathering
rather than specific recommendations).
69. 1993 La. Act 767 (codified as LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:201 1(D)(5), 2074(B)(1) (West
1993)).
70. Hacker, supra note 65, at 9-10. Specific recommendations include:
1) strengthening land use planning requirements in the state;
2) strengthening the regulations regarding the transportation of toxic materials;
3) providing tax incentives to reduce the generation of hazardous waste in Louisiana;
4) strengthening statutes pertaining to emergency response situations in order to meet the
needs of adjacent communities;
5) providing funding to the DEQ to expand the Environmental Justice Program, establish a
community/industry environmental justice panel, develop a joint project to train citizens in
emergency responses, and to aid Historically Black Universities in the state in developing
support programs which would increase the amount of minority candidates qualified for
positions at the DEQ; and
6) requiring DEQ to report to the legislature on modified public notification procedures, on
the annual status and progress of the Environmental Justice Program, and to review
enforcement alternatives in this area.
Id
71. HACKER, supra note 65, at 21 (citing House Joint Resolution 146 (1993) and describing it as
designed to pave the way for a state bill modeled after former Senator Al Gore's federal legislation).
72. Id.
73. HACKER, supra note 65, at 23 (citing Virginia Joint House Resolution 529 (1993) and
descnbing it as a model for future environmental justice legislation).
1995] 1469
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2. State Legislative Proposals74
Several states have recently introduced environmental justice bills.
Although all were defeated, most will be reintroduced in the 1995
legislative session. The most notable bills, introduced in Georgia, South
Carolina, New York, and California, go beyond mere information gathering
and provide specific regulation.
Georgia's House Bill 368'5 instructs the Director of the Environmental
Protection Division of the Department of Natural Resources to identify the
100 counties with the highest total weight of toxic chemicals and designate
them high-risk areas.76 The Director must then issue a report identifying
the nature and extent of the impacts on human health in these high-risk
areas and compare them with other counties.77 If the director reports
significant adverse impacts on health, the state will impose a moratorium
on the siting of any new facility in that area.78
South Carolina House Bill 3824"9 takes a somewhat different approach.
74. There are also several federal environmental justice bills pending in Congress. Although an
in-depth discussion of these proposals is beyond the scope of this note, a brief capsule of these
proposals may be useful. The Environmental Equal Rights Act, H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993), would enable a citizen petitioner to challenge the construction of a waste facility by showing
that the proposed facility would be located in an environmentally disadvantaged community and that
it may adversely affect the human health or the environment of the community.
The Environmental Health Equity Information Act, H.R. 1925, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), seeks
to amend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1990
(CERCLA) and require the collection of information regarding the race, age, gender, ethnic origin, and
income level of persons living in communities adjacent to toxic substance contamination.
The Environmental Justice Act of 1993, H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993), requires
information gathering to identify and rank environmental high impact areas. Moreover it provides
technical assistance grants and calls for a moratorium on siting in communities already overloaded with
multiple polluting sources.
The Public Health Equity Act of 1994, S. 1841, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993), prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in programs and activities relating to
exposure to hazardous substances.
75. HACKER, supra note 65, at 7 (describing and setting forth Georgia house Bill 368, the
Environmental Justice Act of 1993).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. Ga. H.B. 368 died in the House Committee on Natural Resources and Environment because
of opposition from many large special interest groups. However, H.B. 368 may yet pass. An
Environmental Justice Act is one of the Georgia Black Caucus' top priorities in 1995. Id. In addition,
Environmental Justice grassroots activists have increased awareness of the issue which promises to
increase the pressure on Georgia state legislators in 1995. Id. at 8.
79. HACKER, supra note 65, at 19 (summarizing South Carolina's Environmental Equity Act, South
Carolina House Bill 3824 (1994)).
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It too calls for the identification of environmental high impact areas.8" If
the Department of Health and Environmental Control discovers adverse
health impacts in those areas, the state will impose a moratorium on future
sitings. In addition, the bill authorizes a toxic chemical user fee for
facilities located in these areas.8" Revenue generated by these user fees
would enable individuals, citizen groups, and government agencies in the
high-risk area to obtain an independent impact study on the effects of the
facility, thus facilitating local, informed participation in the process.82
The legislation proposed in New York and California would focus on
regulating permit applicants. California Assembly Bill 221283 requires
permit applicants to include a description of the project site demograph-
ics." Similarly, New York Assembly Bill 714085 requires the permit
applicant to submit a plan outlining an economic development strategy to
reduce unemployment or poverty rates in any economically distressed
community selected as a facility location.86
B. Analysis
A realistic and workable solution to siting dilemmas can not evolve
without state experimentation. Thus, although this Recent Development
raises concerns about aspects of both Arkansas' law and other states'
proposals, these models serve as positive steps towards achieving
environmental justice.
Arkansas' "Environmental Equity Act" utilizes a version of the local
control approach combined with compensation or incentive mechanisms.87
Affected communities may choose whether to block the proposed siting by
80, Id.
81. Id.
82, Id. S.C. H.B. 3824 died in the House Agriculture, Natural Resources & Environmental Affairs
Committee. According to Van Heggler, Director of Research for this Committee, the bill died for two
reasons. First, business interests were adamantly opposed to the bill. Id. Second, there was a lack of
interaction and united support behind the bill from environmental and grassroots communities. Id. at
20
83. Cal. A.B. 2212 (1993).
84. HACKER, supra note 65, at 3. The issues raised in Cal. A.B. 2212 have been raised on two
pnor occasions. On each occasion, the bill passed the legislature but was subsequently vetoed by
Governor Pete Wilson, who believes that the bill will burden the state's businesses. Id.
85. HACKER, supra note 65, at 16 (summarizing New York Assembly Bill 7140 (1994)).
86. Id,
87. ARK, CODE ANN. S8-6-1501.The statute actually employs a unique version of the local control
method because only communities with an exciting solid waste management facility have the authority
to say "Not In My Backyard".
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withholding their consent, or to accept the facility in return for compensa-
tion.88 Thus, Arkansas' approach empowers communities which have been
politically powerless in the past and gives them control over their
neighborhoods. 9
However, Arkansas' approach raises several concerns. First, the statute
does not specify what resources the community has to make an educated
evaluation of the proposed facility. While they may certainly rely on
personal experiences, affected communities are entitled to more informa-
tion. Charlotte Bullock of South Central Los Angeles states her reliance on
personal experience succinctly: "The [L.A. City] Council is going to build
something in my community which might kill my child...I don't need a
scientist to tell me that's wrong."" However, personal experience may, at
times, be insufficient. If targeted communities are making acceptance
decisions without full and accurate knowledge of the risks and harms
involved, questions of fairness and morality arise.
Even if communities understand the risks, Arkansas' approach raises the
additional concern that the poorest communities will sacrifice health and
safety for economic gain.9 In fact, the Arkansas' Act has not thus far
served as an effective barrier to the siting of facilities in less affluent
neighborhoods. Rather host communities have accepted them in exchange
for promises of jobs and economic development.92 Finally, Arkansas'
approach allows communities to trade away the rights of future generations
not represented in the decision-making process.93
In summary, community empowerment, that provides the affected
community with full and accurate knowledge of the risks involved, is a
88. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
89. Some commentators have argued that "community empowerment" is a necessary prerequisite
to achieving environmental justice and that the "mainstream" environmental movement must encompass
this type of grassroots environmentalism in order to evolve equitably. See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment
as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECoLOoY L.Q.
619, 639-41 (1992). The only way to achieve a more equitable distribution of environmental risks is
through community empowerment at the grassroots level. Id. at 657-58. The decision to site a facility
is a political and economic one. Id. Thus, legal strategies are doomed to fail because they do not alter
the political and economic power relations in the community that spawned the environmental threat. Id.
Cole points to the failures of the civil rights laws to end racism evidence that these same laws are
inadequate to address environmental equity issues. Id. at 647-48.
90. Id. at 662-63 ("... . [P]eople who actually bear the burden of pollution are experts in their own
right: .... [Their] experiences are as valid, or more valid, than those of the traditional experts.")
91. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
92. HAcKER, supra note 65, at 2. (citing statement of Mike Hood, Arkansas Pollution Control and
Ecology Department, Solid Waste Division).
93. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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positive step towards combating environmental inequity. Communities in
Arkansas that do not want waste facilities can keep them out. The concern
remains, however, that even with full knowledge, some communities may
be forced to sacrifice present and future health for immediate economic
relief.
In contrast, the majority of the other states' proposals adopt a super
review or site designation approach. Georgia and South Carolina, for
example, would ultimately place the siting decision in the hands of the state
government, although the state would encourage locally affected communi-
ties to participate in the decision-making process.94 These methods place
a higher priority on state guidance than on community empowerment. The
problem with these proposals is that if the state decides that siting the
facility would not significantly impact human health, the community
becomes burdened with the site without the benefit of a compensation
package.95
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Acknowledging that political opposition is a formidable barrier to
environmental justice legislation, this Recent Development attempts to
outline a proposed model of state legislation with the greatest potential for
achieving environmental equity.
Arkansas' legislation rests on the solid premise that siting decisions are
inherently more just when the affected community controls the outcome.
Working from this premise, Arkansas' legislation could be strengthened in
a number of ways.
A. Assure Informed Consent
A community cannot voluntarily enter into a siting agreement if it does
not fully understand the risks and harms involved. In order to ensure
complete and accurate knowledge, model state legislation should include
a mechanism that provides affected communities with funds enabling them
to conduct independent health and safety analyses. Two potential sources
exist for these funds. First, state legislation could include a provision
similar to South Carolina's proposed legislation, authorizing a toxic
94. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text, discussing Georgia and South Carolina's bills.
95. Cf New York Assembly Bill 7140 (1994) (employing a super review approach with a built
in compensation scheme that requires developers to submit an economic development strategy in an
effort to reduce unemployment and poverty rates within the affected community).
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chemical user fee.96 The state could set aside the funds raised by these
user fees for local communities to obtain independent impact studies.
Alternatively, the state could require the developer negotiating with the
community over the proposed facility to pay for an independent study.97
B. Fair Negotiation
In addition to full and accurate information, model state legislation
should include a mechanism ensuring that the affected community receives
a fair compensation package. To achieve this end, the state should create
some form of environmental equity siting board.98 This entity would act
as a clearinghouse for siting agreements by giving local communities access
to the terms and the result of siting agreements negotiated by other
communities.99 The board would also provide local communities access
to other compensation packages negotiated by the particular developer.'
This will help equalize the parties' respective bargaining power because
communities will then have insight into what the developer has given in the
past.
C. Intergenerational Equity
Even with informed consent and fair negotiation, the risk remains that
communities will choose economic benefits over risks that could affect
96. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
97. Been, supra note 44, at 793. Compensation prior to construction often takes the form of grants
given by developers to the host community to hire its own expert to evaluate the proposed facility.
Others, however, have proposed that developers of waste facilities offer to clean up all or some of a
community's existing sites in exchange for approval of the proposed facility. Id. (citing Kent E.
Portnoy, Siting Hazardous Waste Treatment Facilities: The NIMBY Syndrome, 137-59 (1991)).
98. Ideally, the siting board should be as non-political as possible. Members should include
academics in the areas of public health, city planning, and law, along with geologists, chemical
engineers, state agency persons, and local representatives from across the state. Most importantly, the
board should strive to insure that local representatives embody a diverse cross section of racial and
socioeconomic groups.
The means by which board members are selected will undoubtedly impact the board's neutrality.
If members are chosen by state representatives, the danger remains that they may act as a proxy for
politicians from more affluent areas and attempt to pressure poorer communities into accepting
environmental hazards. No solution is free from any danger of unfair political influence. However, the
risk is minimized when the Board acts as an advisor rather than decisionmaker. The Board's decision-
making power should be limited to preventing communities from hosting too many facilities. See infra
note 101 and accompanying text.
99. Been, supra note 44, at 825. There is little research on how siting agreements have worked
out in practice. Id.
100. Id. Industries would be prohibited from imposing, as a condition to the compensation
agreement, the condition that the community not reveal its terms.
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future generations. To prevent such an outcome, model legislation should
include a provision whereby the state environmental equity siting board can
intervene and place a moratorium on the siting of new facilities in an area
it deems overburdened. The board would conduct regular inspections and
impact studies in environmental high impact areas. If the Board found
significant impacts on human health, it would impose a moratorium.'
This way the board would act not only as a clearinghouse for information
but also as a watchdog for future generation's.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no quick-fix solution to the distributional concerns raised by the
generation and consequent disposal of toxic and hazardous wastes. No one
wants a toxic waste site in their community. However, as long as industries
produce hazardous wastes, a system for the equitable distribution of waste
facilities must be developed. So far, the evidence strongly suggests that
poor and minority communities disproportionately bear the burden of
environmental hazards. In order to reverse this trend, state legislatures can
and must reform their siting practices to produce more equitable results. A
workable solution to siting dilemmas necessitates state experimentation.
This Recent Development has attempted to outline a framework upon
which state legislatures can build, emphasizing local community empower-
ment, adequate resources to assure informed consent and safety mechanisms
to protect both current and future generations.
Stacy Hart
101. The board's power would be limited to preventing a community from hosting too many sites.
This model differs from both the super review and site designation approaches in that the board would
neither make the ultimate siting decision nor create any inventory of potential sites. This eliminates the
risk that board members would approve a site over local opposition as well as the risk that politicians
from affluent communities would be able to lobby the board to remove their district from any inventory
list.
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DIRECTOR LIABILITY AND THE INSOLVENT, FEDERALLY
CHARTERED FINANCIAL INSTITUTION: A STANDARD
EMERGES
This Recent Development discusses the standard of liability for directors
and officers' of failed, federally chartered financial institutions. In
particular, it focuses on the effect the Financial Institution Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA)2 has on the standard of liability
when a federally chartered institution operates in a state which provides a
cause of action for simple negligence.3 Although federal regulators can sue
directors of state chartered institutions under state law standards,4
controversy exists over whether state law simple negligence standards apply
to directors of federally chartered institutions after FIRREA.
The Seventh Circuit recently addressed this issue in Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Chapman.5 A divided court concluded that, federal regulators
could not sue the directors of failed, federal institutions under state simple
negligence standards.6 Rather, the directors were held to the FIRREA's less
stringent gross negligence standard.7
Part I of this Recent Development discusses the corporate and legal
climate that prompted Congress to pass FIRREA. Part II examines the text
and history of FIRREA and cases interpreting the statute's liability
provisions. Part III analyzes the Chapman decision. Finally, this Recent
Development examines how Chapman frustrates congressional intent by
insulating directors of federally chartered institutions from liability and by
1. The remainder of this note will refer only to directors. Such references include officers as well.
2. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.A.).
3. This Recent Development is limited to discussing the propriety of applying state law standards
of liability to the directors of insolvent, federally chartered financial institutions. FIRREA authorizes
federal regulatory agencies to assert the claims of an institution against the institution's directors only
after the institution has been placed into receivership or conservatorship. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)
(Supp. V 1993). Therefore, the issues raised by director liability actions prior to insolvency are beyond
the scope of this Recent Development. Moreover, this Recent Development does not focus on the
application of state law standards to state chartered institutions. For a discussion of state law standards
and the state chartered institution, see Jon Shepard, Note, The Liability of Officers and Directors Under
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 90 MICH. L. Rsv. 1119
(1992).
4. See FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1440 (1993);
FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992).
5. 29 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994).
6. Id. at 1123.
7. Id.
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decreasing a state's power to regulate corporate activity within its borders.
I. DIRECTOR LIABILITY AND THE NEED FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION
Courts reviewing the actions of directors of financial institutions rarely
impose personal liability on directors Rather, these directors fall under
the protection of the business judgement rule.' This rule arose out of a
concern for judicial competence in business affairs'" and the need for
directors to have the freedom to take risks in the interests of their
businesses.' Under the business judgement rule, courts are reluctant to
second guess management decisions.'2 Rather, courts have developed a
uniform standard of liability whereby, in the absence of a conflict of
interest transaction, 3 a director does not face personal liability for
management decisions unless grossly negligent in failing to gather all
relevant information before making a business decision.'4
8. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) ("A corporate officer who makes a mistake
in judgement as to economic conditions, consumer tastes or production line efficiency will rarely, if
ever, be found liable for damages suffered by the corporation.'), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
9. "The 'businessjudgment' rule sustains corporate transactions and immunizes management from
liability where the transaction is within the powers of the corporation (intra vires) and the authority of
management, and involves the exercise of due care and compliance with applicable fiduciary duties."
HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 242 (3d. ed. 1983). See also
American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance § 4.01 (1994) (stating suggested statutory
codification of the business judgment rule, with annotations).
10. See North, 692 F.2d at 886. The North court discussed the limitations of the judicial process
in areas of business, noting that: "[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect
device to evaluate corporate business decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are
not easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call for quick
decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information." Id.
11. In explaining the value of risk-taking by a corporate enterprise, the North court stated:
[B]ecause potential profit often corresponds to the potential risk, it is very much in the
interest of shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly cautious corporate
decisions. Some opportunities offer great profits at the risk of very substantial losses, while
the alternatives offer less risk of loss but also less potential profit.
Id.
12. See id. at 885-86.
13. When a director uses his corporate position to further personal rather than corporate interests,
the transaction is said to be a conflict of interest transaction violative of the director's fiduciary duty
of loyalty. See HmN & ALExANDER, supra note 9, § 238. The director may be held personally liable
to the corporation for any damages arising from the transaction. Id. This Recent Development is limited
in scope to the potential liability arising from a director's violation of the fiduciary duty of care.
14. Two prominent Delaware director liability cases illustrate the prevailing standard of care that
developed under the business judgement rule. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985)
("We think the concept of gross negligence is also the proper standard for determining whether a
business judgement reached by a board of directors was an informed one."); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("While the Delaware cases use a variety of terms to describe the applicable
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Despite the apparent safe harbor that a gross negligence standard of
liability imparts, in Smith v. Van Gorkom5 the Delaware Supreme Court
indicated a willingness to find directors liable under this standard. 6 While
the facts in Van Gorkom arguably rose to the level of gross negligence in
light of the lack of information gathered by the board prior to approving
a major transaction,17 the decision nonetheless frightened directors and
caused states to reassess their approach to director liability. 8
Many states continue to hold directors to the standard of care that an
ordinarily prudent person would exercise in a similar situation. 9 The Van
Gorkom decision led many other states to enact statutes designed to reduce
or eliminate a director's risk of liability and to extend the protection the
Delaware Supreme Court appeared unwilling to offer.2" Although some
states provide that only intentional or reckless conduct will lead to liability,
others permit shareholders to entirely limit or eliminate a director's
personal liability.2 The states that shield directors beyond the protection
standard of care.... under the business judgement rule director liability is predicated upon concepts
of gross negligence").
15. 488 A.2d 858.
16. Id. at 893.
17. See id. at 874; see also Andrew G.T. Moore II, The 1980s-Did We Save the Stockholders
While the Corporation Burned?, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 277, 281 (1992). Justice Moore, who joined the
majority opinion in Van Gorkom, explains that the decision did not create new law. Rather, he notes,
the court applied "well-established principles to egregious facts.' Id. at 281.
18. See Stephen A. Radin, The Director's Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom,
39 HASTINGS L. J. 707, 709 (1988) (analyzing post-Van Gorkom decisions and state legislative efforts
to address director liability).
19. "Thirty-eight jurisdictions require that a director of a corporation discharge the duties of his
office [with]... the care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances."
2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30 annot. (3d ed. 1993) (statutory comparison); see, e.g., REV.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(2) (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(d) (West Supp. 1994);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1541a(l) (1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (Supp. 1994); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-2035 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:8:30 (Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-
30(a) (1990).
20. See James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability
Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207, 1209-10 (1988) (noting that since the year the
Delaware Supreme Court decided Van Gorkom, more than forty states "have adopted some form of
legislation designed to reduce the risk of directors' personal liability for money damages.').
21. See Shephard, supra note 3, at 1120 n.7 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.210(1)(N) (1989));
Apiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-054(A)(9) (1990) (permitting shareholders to limit or eliminate director
liability); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202(B)(3) (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10)
(1990) (shareholder power to limit eliminate director liability); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101(u) (Supp.
1991) (shareholder power to limit or eliminate liability); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp.
1991) (shareholder power to limit or eliminate director liability); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(4)
(Michie 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 23-415-48.5 (Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-54(2) (Supp. 1991);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (West Supp. 1991) (precluding director liability unless conduct
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provided by the previously impenetrable gross negligence standard set the
stage for directors to act with presumed impunity.
This presumed impunity appeared most acute in the management of
America's financial institutions.' In addition to effectively being shielded
from liability by the statutes of several states, directors of financial
institutions enjoyed the added protection of federally insured operating
capital' and the simultaneous deregulation of the banking industry.24
"constitutes willful misconduct orrecklessness"); IoWA CODEANN. § 490.832 0Vest 1991); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8) (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.2-020(2)(d) (Michie 1989); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:24(c)(4) (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1991); MD.
CORPS. & ASSNS. CODE ANN. § 2-405.2 (Supp. 1991); MASS, GEN. L. ch. 156B, § 13(b)(1) (1988);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1209(c) (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(4) (West Supp.
1992); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2035(2) (Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037(1) (1991); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 293-A:54(I-a) (Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (West Supp. 1991); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 53-12-2(E) (Michie Supp. 1991); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney Supp.
1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) (1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1006(B)(7) (West Supp.
1992); OR. REv. STAT. § 60.047(2)(c) (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-48(a)(6) (Supp. 1991); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-2-102(e) (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-58.8 (1991); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(3) (Supp. 1991); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-7.06(B) (Vest Supp.
1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-49.1 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.320 (1989); WiS. STAT.
ANN. § 180.0828 (West Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. § 17-16-834 (1989)); see also OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson 1992) (providing for director liability only when director's "action or
failure to act involved an act or omission undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the
corporation or undertaken with reckless disregard for the best interests of the corporation.').
22. For a thorough discussion of the mismanagement of financial institutions during the latter part
of the 1980s, see David B. Fischer, Comment, Bank Director Liability Under FIRREA: A New Defense
for Directors and Officers ofInsolvent Depository Institutions-Or a Tighter Noose?, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1703, 1706-07 (1992). Fischer explains:
Of the many causes contributing to the depository institution crisis, substantial attention
focused on the misdeeds perpetrated by some bank and thrift directors .... One savings and
loan scandal, focusing on a thrift director's efforts to "buy friends in Washington," implicated
five United States Senators.. . .The director of one failed institution was accused of spending
$850,000 of his thrift's funds to acquire "the world's foremost collection of magic-related
books, artifacts and artwork," according to regulators. Another was charged with squandering
his thrift's assets on prostitutes, beach houses, and a yacht. The excesses covered the
proverbial sublime-to-ridiculous range.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
23. See 12 U.S.C. § 1811(a) (1988) (creating the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
and providing that the FDIC "shall insure... the deposits of all banks and savings associations which
are entitled to the benefits of insurance under this chapter"); see also John M. Berry and Kathleen Day,
High Stakes as Banks Shed Reins; Taxpayers'Liability, Customers'Service at Risk, WASHINOTON POST
July 26, 1987, at HI (questioning the wisdom behind deregulating an industry whose major source of
money is insured by the federal government).
24. For a discussion of the deregulation of the banking industry and the commensurate expansion
of savings institutions' powers in the 1980s, see I MICHAEL P. MALLOY, THE CORPORATE LAW OF
BANKS: REGULATION OF CORPORATE AND SECURITIES AcrTIvrrEs OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS § 1.2
(1988) (noting that since 1980, the'powers of savings and loans has been expanded dramatically). See
also Douglas Frantz and Tom Furlong, Contagion of Ailing S&L's Poses Threat to Entire Thrift
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This degree of protection facilitated flagrant mismanagement of the
industry." When federal banking agencies26 sought to curb this misman-
agement, the same state statutes that stimulated the director's mismanage-
ment in the first instance rendered the agencies' attempts to redress the
situation futile.27 Congress responded by enacting the FIRREA, which
allows federal intervention into the field of corporate governance, an area
traditionally governed by state law.28 Unfortunately, the scope and effect
of this intervention remains uncertain.
II. FIRREA: MAKING DIRECTOR LIABILITY MORE STRINGENT
In response to state laws that insulated directors from liability, Congress
enacted FIRREA in 1989.' 9 In passing FIRREA, Congress sought to
strengthen the power of federal regulators0 and to curtail activities that
placed federal insurance funds at risk.31 To accomplish these objectives,
Congress needed to overcome the barriers to director liability imposed by
the recently enacted state legislation.32 Therefore, Congress enacted
Industry, L.A. TiMES, Jan. 3, 1988, at I ("The savings and loan business has been in trouble ever-since
[the 1980s] began... at first suffering huge losses sparked by soaring interest rates and later from poor
quality lending that was aided by bank deregulation. ..
25. See supra note 22.
26. The main federal regulatory bodies charged with policing the actions of financial institutions
are the FDIC and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). Congress has empowered the FDIC to
operate as a receiver and as a conservator, succeeding to any claims the shareholders may have had
against the institution's directors, 18 U.S.C. § 1821(c),(d)(1) (Supp. V 1993). Pursuant to FIRREA,
Congress created the RTC as an instrument of the United States, with powers similar to the FDIC
regarding receivership and conservatorship. 12 U.S.C. § 144la(b)(l) (Supp. V 1993).
27. In explaining an amendment to an early draft of FIRREA, Senator Reigle, Chairperson of the
Senate Banking Committee, expressed concern that "many states have enacted legislation that protects
directors and officers of companies from damage suits." 135 CoNO. REc. S4278 (daily ed. April 19,
1989).
28. See Cindy A. Schipani, Should Bank Directors Fear FIRREA: The FDIC's Enforcement of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, 17 J. CoRP. L. 739, 741 (1992).
29. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73,103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in various sections of the U.S.C.).
30. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, §101(9), 103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1811 (note) (Supp. V 1993)).
31. FIRREAPub. L.No. 101-73,101(3), 103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989) (codifiedat 12U.S.C. § 1811
(note) (Purposes of 1989 Amendment) (Supp. V 1993)).
32. FIRREA's legislative history makes it clear that the means by which the statute empowers
federal regulators and protects federally insured deposit funds involves preempting the state legislation
that made it difficult or impossible to hold directors personally liable. See H.R. Rep. No. 222, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 393, 398 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 432,437 ("[FIRREA] preempts State
law with respect to claims brought by the FDIC in any capacity against officers or directors of an
insured depository institution.'); 135 CONG. REC, S6912 (daily ed. June 19, 1989) ("[Section 1821(k)
of FIRREA] enables the FDIC to pursue claims against directors or officers of insured financial
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section 1821(k).33
A. Section 1821(k)
Section 1821(k) contains two relevant parts that determine the propriety
of state law claims under FIRREA.34 The first sentence of section 1821(k)
states that, in actions brought by federal regulatory agencies, directors of
federally insured financial institutions "may" be liable "for gross negli-
gence, including any similar conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard
of a duty of care ... ."I' Thus, by authorizing federal regulators to sue
for gross negligence, Congress preempted state laws that predicated director
liability upon reckless or other more culpable misconduct, as well as those
statutes that permitted shareholders to eliminate a director's liability.36
However, Congress expressly left the task of defining gross negligence to
the states.37
institutions for gross negligence (or negligent conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty
of care than gross negligence) or for intentional tortious conduct. This right supersedes state law
limitations that... would bar or impede such claims.").
33. See 135 CONG. REc. S4278 (daily ed. April 19, 1989). Senator Reigle's discussion of the
provision that would ultimately evolve into § 1821(k) explained that state insulating statutes protected
directors from liability and that:
[§ 1821(k)] totally preempt[s] State law in this area with respect to suits brought by the FDIC
against bank directors or officers. However, in light of the State law implications raised by
this provision,. . . State law would be overruled only to the extent that it forbids the FDIC
to bring suit based on "gross negligencee" or an "intentional tort." In determining whether or
not conduct constitutes "gross negligence"1 or an "intentional tort," applicable State law is to
govern. This amendment would thus allow the FDIC to sue a director or ofTicer guilty of
gross negligence or willdl misconduct, even if State law did not allow it.
Id. (emphasis added).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) provides in pertinent part:
A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be held personally liable for
monetary damages in any civil action by, on behalf of, or at the request or direction of the
[FDIC or RTC] ... for gross negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct that
demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) including intentional
tortious conduct as such terms are defined and determined under applicable State law. Nothing
in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the [FDIC or RTC] under other applicable
law.
§ 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993).
35. Id.
36. See supra notes 31-32. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution state
laws that conflict with a provision of federal law will be preempted. See generally Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604-06 (1991) (ruling a local government's attempt to regulate
pesticide use was preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act). Thus, any state
law requiring conduct more culpable than gross negligence to impose liability would be preempted
under FIRREA's authorization of suits for gross negligence. See 12 U.S.C. § 182 1(k) (Supp. V 1993).
37. Id. Definitions of gross negligence vary from state to state. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984) ("There is ... no generally
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The second sentence of section 1821(k) impacts the validity of state law
simple negligence claims under FIRREA, by preserving federal regulators'
rights to sue directors under "other applicable law."38 This phrase clearly
demonstrates Congress' intent not to impair federal regulators' access to
other, more stringent means of exposing directors to liability.a9
Surprisingly, despite the fact that over half of all savings and loans have
federal charters,4° neither FIRREA's text nor its history refer to those
charters.4 The statute's failure to differentiate between state and federally
chartered institutions permits the conclusion that section 1821(k) and its
preservation of state law claims applies to both types of institutions.
Moreover, in light of Congress' goal of empowering federal regulators,42
congressional silence on the matter strongly suggests that it did not intend
to use FIRREA's gross negligence standard to insulate directors from
liability when they would otherwise be subject to state law simple
negligence standards.43 Nonetheless, there is some doubt as to whether
directors of federally chartered institutions remain subject to state law
simple negligence claims.
B. Cases Interpreting Section 1821(k)
Two types of cases shed light on the propriety of state law simple
negligence claims against the directors of federally chartered institutions.
First, both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have recently discussed the validity
accepted meaning [of gross negligence].").
38. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993).
39. See supra note 33; see also 135 CONG. REC. S 6912 (daily ed. June 19, 1989)("[Section
1821(k)] does not prevent the FDIC from pursuing claims under State law or under other applicable
Federal law, if such law permits the officers or directors of a financial institution to be sued.., for
violating a lower standard of care, such as simple negligence.") For a thorough discussion of FIRREA's
legislative history and support of FIRREA's preservation of state law claims against state chartered
institutions, see Shepard, supra note 3. For a discussion of the possible use of FIRREA as a defense
to state law claims, see Fischer, supra note 22.
40. See National Comm'n on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement: Origins
and Causes of the S&L Debacle: A Blueprint for Reform: A Report to the President and Congress
(G.P.O. 1993).
41. See FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 1126 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) ("The liability of directors of S&L's which happened to have federal rather than state
charters was not discussed [by Congress], even though more than half of all S&L's were federally
chartered.").
42. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
43. For a discussion of FIRREA's legislative history indicating that directors may be subject to
suits under state law standards of liability after FIRREA, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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of state law claims against state chartered institutions. These cases illustrate
how section 1821(k) operates to effectuate Congress' purpose of subjecting
directors to liability for their negligent actions.44 Second, in Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Gallagher,5 the Seventh Circuit recently discussed
FIRREA's effect on federal common law claims against federal institutions.
Gallagher provides a framework for analyzing FIRREA in the federal
charter context.
46
1. State Law and the State-Chartered Institution
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canfield,47 the Tenth Circuit
held that FIRREA does not hinder the ability of federal regulators to rely
on state law simple negligence claims against state chartered institutions.4"
In Canfield, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) brought a
state law claim against the directors of a Utah Savings and Loan for
negligent mismanagement of the institution.49 Arguing that section 1821(k)
preempts state law simple negligence liability by imposing a federal gross
negligence standard, the directors of the institution sought to dismiss the
FDIC's simple negligence claim50
However, the Tenth Circuit explained that the language, purpose, and
history of FIRREA did not support the directors' position."1 In rejecting
the directors' argument, the Canfield court focused first on the plain
44. See infra notes 47-65.
45. 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993).
46. See infra notes 66-77.
47. 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992).
48. Id. at 449. A number of district courts have held similarly. See, e.g., RTC v. Rahn, 854 F.
Supp. 480 (W.D. Mich. 1994); RTC v. Heiserman, 839 F. Supp. 1457 (D. Colo. 1993); RTC v.
DiDomenico, 837 F. Supp. 623 (D.N.J. 1993); RTC v. Gershman, 829 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mo. 1993);
FDIC v. Miller, 781 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D. Ill. 1991); FDIC v. Williams, 779 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Tex.
1991), claim dismissed, 781 F. Supp. 1271. But see FDIC v. Swager, 773 F. Supp. 1244 (D. Minn.
1991); FDIC v. Brown, 737 F. Supp. 626 (D. Utah 1989).
49. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 444.
50. Id. at 445.
51. Id. at 446-449. In stating its holding, the court noted that "the plain language of the statute
demands" a denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. at 449. In addition to basing its decision
on the text of § 1821(k), the court also indicated that FIRREA's "legislative history is consistent with
our interpretation of the statute's plain language." Id. at 448 n.6 (citing 135 CoNO. REC. S4278-79
(daily ed. April 19, 1989); 135 CoNG. REc. 86912 (daily ed. June 19, 1989)). Also, the court noted that
to hold that federal regulators could not bring state law claims would frustrate Congress's stated purpose
of protecting the federally insured deposit funds. Id. at 449 (citing FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
§ 101(3), 103 Stat, 183, 187 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (note) (Purpose of 1989 Amendment)
(Supp. V 1993)).
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language of section 1821(k). 2 The court held that because section 1821(k)
states that federal regulators "may" bring actions for gross negligence, as
opposed to "may only" bring an action for gross negligence, FIRREA did
not foreclose a state law simple negligence action.53
The court found support for its conclusion in section 1812(k)'s section
dealing with preservation of "other applicable law."54 Believing state law
simple negligence claims to constitute "other applicable law," the court
reasoned that Congress authorized simple negligence claims when the state
in which the institution operated permitted such claims." The court also
noted that Congress' decision to let the state law define gross negligence
belied the directors' argument that Congress intended FIRREA to set a
uniform gross negligence standard.56
Finally, the court noted an absurdity in the directors' position. The
court explained that the failure of a financial institution triggers the federal
regulators' ability to sue the institution's directors on behalf of the
52. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 449 ("We hold that the plain language of the statute demands"
application of the state law standard of care.). In particular, the court focused on the language in
§ 1821(k) providing that "a director or officer may be held personally liable for monetary damages...
for gross negligence." Id. at 446 (alteration in original) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993)).
53. Id. The court stated that:
"May" is a permissive term, and it does not imply a limitation on the standards of officer and
director liability .... [N]o reasonable construction of "may" results in an absolute limitation
of the liability of officers or directors to instances of gross negligence. Rather, the first
sentence of section 1821(k) effectively provides that even where state law under which the
FDIC is authorized to bring suit otherwise limits actions against officers and directors to
intentional misconduct, an officer or director may nevertheless be held liable for gross
negligence. In states where an officer or director is liable for simple negligence, however, the
FDIC may rely, as it does in this case, on state law to enable its action.
Id (citations omitted). For additional case law supporting the position that "may" does not equate to
"may only," see Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 626-27 (implying that "may" should not be read as "may
only"), and Resolution Trust Corp. v. Lightfoot, 938 F.2d 65, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1991) (same).
54. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446-47. For a statement of the pertinent provision of § 1821(k), see
supra note 34.
55. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446-47. The court explained its reasoning with regard to § 1821(k)'s last
sentence as follows:
[W]e believe that "other applicable law" means all "other applicable law." Under the statute
then, any other law providing that an officer or director may be held liable for simple
negligence survives; such a law would be an "other applicable law," and construing the statute
to bar its application would "impair the FDIC's rights under it."
Id (footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 447. The court reasoned that "[s]tate law definitions of gross negligence differ. Indeed,
'there is ... no generally accepted meaning [of gross negligence].' These differences mean that the
statute cannot possibly, even without the last sentence, create a national standard of liability." Id.
(citations omitted).
57. Id. at 449.
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shareholders, whereas a shareholder of the institution can sue under state
law at any time prior to failure.5" Thus, the court noted that preventing
federal regulators from employing state law provisions could, in effect,
induce directors of a struggling institution to allow the institution to fail in
order to obtain the shield of FIRREA's gross negligence standard.59
Reasoning that such a result would impair Congress' purpose of protecting
federally insured deposit funds, the court held that FIRREA did not
preempt state law provisions for simple negligence applied to state
chartered institutions.'
Three months after Canfield, the Ninth Circuit reached the same
conclusion in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. McSweeney.61
McSweeney involved the FDIC's attempt to hold the directors of a
California savings and loan liable under that state's simple negligence
standard of liability.62 The directors moved to dismiss the state law claim,
also arguing that FIRREA set a uniform gross negligence standard of
liability and therefore preempted actions based on state law.63 Relying on
reasoning similar to the Canfield court's,' the Ninth Circuit rejected the
directors' motion to dismiss and held that FIRREA permits federal
58. Id.
59. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 449.
60. Id. ("It simply cannot be that FIRREA would indirectly encourage such behavior...
61. 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2440 (1993).
62. Id. at 533. When appointed to the board of Central Savings and Loan, McSweeney instituted
some questionable loan and investment programs which resulted in substantial losses. Id. The Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Company (FSLIC) placed Central into receivership. Id. Because of the
receivership, the FDIC succeeded to Central's claims against McSweeney and subsequently brought suit
under California Corporate Code § 309 for negligent mismanagement of the institution. Id. at 533-34.
63. Id. at 534. The directors also argued that the FDIC's claim was barred by the statute of
limitations. Id. The court disagreed. Id. at 536.
64. Id. at 536-41. In many ways, the McSweeney court's opinion parallels that of the Tenth Circuit
in Canfield. The McSweeney court began its analysis by focusing on the permissive nature of §
1821(k)'s first sentence. Id. at 537-38 ("Had Congress intended this authorizing provision to limit the
FDIC to claims alleging gross negligence or greater culpability, it would have inserted the word "only"
in the sentence.'). The court also relied upon the second sentence of§ 1821(k) to reject the defendants'
argument that FIRREA created a single, uniform standard. Id. at 538-39. ("Like the Canfield court, we
find no limitation [in the second sentence of § 1821(k)] that would preclude the FDIC from seeking
remedies available under state law."). Moreover, the McSweeney court noted that its reading of the
statute's plain language squared with the statute's legislative history. Id. at 540. Finally, similar to the
Canfield court, the McSweeney court thought that the directors' argument that FIRREA created a
uniform standard of gross negligence would create "the perverse incentive for a director in an institution
that is having financial difficulty to permit the thrift to fall into ruin ... since the director's own
exposure would be greatly reduced upon the institution of a receivership." Id. (quoting Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. v. McSweeney, 772 F. Supp. 1154, 1159 (S.D. Cal. 1991), afid, 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2440 (1993)).
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regulators to sue directors of failed financial institutions under a more
stringent standard of liability than gross negligence if state law allows such
a claim.65
2. Federal Common Law Actions after FIRREA
Another type of case interpreting section 1821(k) involves federally
chartered institutions. These cases address whether FIRREA's gross
negligence standard preempts federal common law's simple negligence
standard.' In 1993, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit to analyze
the propriety of a federal common law simple negligence action after
FIRREA.67
In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gallagher,68 the Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion (RTC) sued the directors of a federally chartered institution.69 The
RTC sought to recover losses resulting from the directors' negligence.7"
The RTC premised its claim on the theory that FIRREA did not preempt
federal common law actions based on simple negligence.71
65. McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 541.
66. In all cases discussing this issue, courts have accepted for the sake of argument that federal
common law provides for simple negligence liability. The majority of these courts have ruled that
FIRREA's gross negligence standard preempts federal common law. See, e.g., RTC v. Miramon, 22
F.3d 1357, 1364 (5th Cir. 1994); FDIC v. Harrington, 844 F. Supp. 300, 304-05 (N.D. Tex. 1994);
FDIC v. Bates, 838 F. Supp. 1216, 1220 (N.D. Ohio 1993), rev'd, 42 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1994); FDIC
v. Gonzalez-Gorrondona, 833 F. Supp. 1545, 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1993); RTC v. Farmer, 823 F. Supp. 302,
307 (E.D. Pa. 1993); RTC v. Hecht, 818 F. Supp. 894, 901-02 (D. Md. 1992); FDIC v. Brown, 812 F.
Supp. 722, 726 (S.D. Tex. 1992); FDIC v. Barham, 794 F. Supp. 187, 191 (W.D. La. 1991), aff'd, 995
F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1993); FDIC v. Miller, 781 F. Supp. 1271, 1275 (N.D. II. 1991). See contra RTC
v. Gibson, 829 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 (W.D. Mo. 1993); RTC v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (D. Utah
1993) (concluding that "§ 1821(k) does not... preempt applicable ... federal common law."); FDIC
v. Nihiser, 799 F. Supp. 904, 907 (C.D. Ill. 1992).
67. RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 417 (7th Cir. 1993) ("No other circuit courts have directly
addressed this issue.").
68. 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993).
69. Id. at 418. In 1990, the Concordia Federal Bank for Savings failed and the RTC placed the
institution into receivership. Id. The RTC instituted the federal common law simple negligence actions
on behalf of the shareholders of the institution against Concordia's directors. The directors allegedly
had mismanaged the bank, causing it to incur losses and fail. Id.
70. Id. In addition to negligence, the RTC also alleged breach of fiduciary duty, gross negligence
and breach of contract Id.
7 1. Id. The RTC's argument that FIRREA did not preempt federal common law relied primarily
on the framework developed by the Canfield and McSweeney courts for state law claims. Id. at 420-22.
The RTC argued that the permissive language of § 1821(k)'s first sentence, the savings clause in the
second sentence, and Congress' purpose of strengthening the power of federal regulators equally
supported the preservation of federal common law simple negligence claims and state law simple
negligence claims. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit sustained the directors' motion to dismiss the RTC's
federal common law simple negligence claim, holding that FIRREA
preempted federal common law.72 The court stated that, in order to
preempt federal common law, Congress need only speak directly to the
issue at hand.73 The court found that FIRREA's authorization of gross
negligence actions spoke directly to the standard of care issue and therefore
preempted any preexisting federal common law standard.7 4 The court
refused to read FIRREA's savings clause as preserving federal common law
simple negligence actions because such a reading would make 1821(k)'s
authorization of gross negligence actions mere surplusage.75
However, the Gallagher court declined to decide whether FIRREA
preempted state law simple negligence claims against directors of a
federally chartered institution.76 According to the court, when federal
preemption of state law is at issue, concerns of federalism require greater
evidence of Congress' preemptory intent than a consideration of the
propriety of federal common law after congressional action.77 The court's
72. Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 424-25.
73. Id. at 419. The court noted at the outset that federal common law plays a very limited role in
areas where Congress has legislated. Id. The court recognized that Congress, not the federal courts,
determines the appropriate standards for federal law. Id. Thus, the court reasoned, if Congress" 'spoke
directly' to the issue of what standard of liability governs suits brought by the RTC against officers and
directors of failed federally chartered financial institutions," then the federal common law standards
would be preempted. Id.
74. Id. at 424-25. In answering whether Congress spoke directly to the issue at hand, the court
noted the following:
It is hard to imagine a more definitive statement by Congress that a gross negligence standard
of liability applies to cases brought by the RTC against officers and directors of failed
financial institutions. Consequently, federal common law.., must yield to Congress' clear
statement that a gross negligence standard of liability applies.
Id. at 420. To support its conclusion, the court referred to prior United States Supreme Court precedent
that found federal common law standards for interstate water pollution to be preempted by Congress'
creation of "a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency." Id.
at 423-24 (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981)). The Gallagher court noted that
similar to the legislation at issue in Milwaukee, FIRREA created a complex regulatory regime that left
no room for federal common law. Id. at 424.
75. Id. at 420 ("It is illogical that Congress intended in one sentence to establish a gross
negligence standard of liability and in the next sentence to eviscerate that standard by allowing actions
under federal common law for simple negligence.").
76. Id. at 424 ("[W]e stress that we do not reach the issue of whether § 1821(k)'s gross negligence
standard pre-empts state law.").
77. Id. In explaining the differing standards governing preemption of state law as opposed to
federal common law, the court stated that:
mhe appropriate analysis in determining if federal statutory law governs a question
previously the subject of federal common law is not the same as that employed in deciding
if federal law pre-empts state law. In considering the latter question "we start with the
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refusal to rule on the preemption of state law in the federal charter context
left the issue open for future consideration. Moreover, by noting the greater
standard of proof required when state law claims are involved, the court
invited federal regulators to bring state law simple negligence claims
against directors of federal institutions. In 1994, the RTC accepted the
invitation.
III. RESOLUTION TRUST CORP. V. CHAPMAN: A UNIFORM STANDARD OF
LIABILITY FOR DIRECTORS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chapman, the Seventh Circuit became the
first circuit to analyze FIRREA in a case involving state law claims against
directors of a federally chartered institution.78 The decision departed from
the cases that recognize Congress' preservation of state law claims for
simple negligence.79 In turn, the court signaled the development of a
uniform gross negligence standard of liability for directors of insolvent,
federally chartered financial institutions."°
In Chapman, the RTC sued the former directors of a failed, federally
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." While we have not
hesitated to find pre-emption of state law, whether express or implied, when Congress has so
indicated, or when enforcement of state regulations would impair "federal superintendence of
the field," our analysis has included "due regard for the presuppositions of our embracing
federal system, including the principle of diffusion of power not as a matter of doctrinaire
localism but as a promoter of democracy." Such concerns are not implicated in the same
fashion when the question is whether federal statutory or federal common law governs, and
accordingly, the same sort of evidence of clear and manifest purpose is not required.
Id (quoting Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 316-17).
78. 29 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994). Prior to the Chapman decision, three district court cases briefly
touched upon the propriety of state law claims against directors of federal institutions. See RTC v.
Ascher, No. CIV.A.92-B-424, 1994 WL 52687, at * 3 (D. Colo. Feb. 14, 1994) (concluding that
FIRREA's savings clause "allows the RTC to bring state based claims for ordinary negligence against
the director defendants of a federally insured, federally-chartered institution."); RTC v. Farmer, 823 F.
Supp. 302, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (concluding that state law claims cannot be brought against directors
of federally chartered institutions); RTC v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1362 (D. Utah 1993) ("[F]ederal
law exclusively governs the internal affairs of federal savings and loan associations, including director
liability.").
79. For a discussion of the two main cases preserving state law claims, see supra notes 47-65 and
accompanying text. While these cases involved state chartered institutions, one district court, without
mentioning McSweeny, noted that Canfield "did not rest upon whether the institution held a state or
federal charter." Ascher, 1994 WL 52687 at *3.
80. Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1123 (stating that FIRREA "adopts gross negligence as the rule for
managers and directors of federal financial institutions").
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chartered financial institution that operated in Illinois." The RTC, on
behalf of the institution's shareholders, sought to recover damages allegedly
resulting from injuries to the federal deposit insurance fund and to the
institution's financial standing. 2 Consistent with Illinois law,8" the RTC
based its claim on a simple negligence theory. 4
The majority held that a gross negligence standard governs suits by the
RTC against directors of failed federally chartered financial institutions.8"
The majority opinion endorsed the Canfield and McSweeney decisions,86
acknowledging that the savings clause in FIRREA permits state law claims
,based on conduct less culpable than the gross negligence standard
prescribed by FIRREA."7 Having determined that FIRREA does not
preempt state law simple negligence claims against directors of state
charted institutions, the court then examined whether federal regulators may
take advantage of state law in actions against federally chartered financial
institutions.88 The court concluded that a choice of law principle known
as the "internal affairs doctrine" prevents the application of state simple
negligence standards to federally chartered institutions.8 9 By creating a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the incorporating jurisdiction's standard
of liability, the internal affairs doctrine resolves the potentially conflicting
81. Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1121-22.
82. Id. at 1121.
83. Id. at 1122. The court assumed that Illinois common law permitted recovery against negligent
directors of financial institutions. Id. (citing Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Munday, 131 N.E. 103 (I11.
1921)).
84. Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122.
85. Id. at 1123.
86. See supra notes 41-60 and accompanying text.
87. Id. Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122. The directors responded to the RTC's simple negligence claim
by arguing that FIRREA preempted all state law claims. After studying the language of § 1821(k), the
court found the directors' position untenable. It. The court noted that:
The final sentence of§ 1821(k)... ensures that actions based on state law are not preempted.
Even if we doubted the correctness of [McSweeney and Canfield] which we do not, we would
not think it prudent to create a conflict among the circuits. Clauses similar to the final
sentence of§ 1821(k) regularly are understood to save state law against claims of preemption.
Thus, the RTC may take advantage of any claims available to it under state law.
Id. at 1122 (citations omitted).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1123. Regarding the appropriate standard of liability to apply, the court determined that
"[tihe advent of inter-state banking ... leads us to apply the internal affairs doctrine to this case.
Security held a federal charter, so national law governs the liability of officers and directors for their
management." Id. For additional discussion of the rationale behind the internal affairs doctrine, see CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88-93 (1987); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645
(1982).
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obligations that follows a corporation's multistate operations.9" Courts
applying the internal affairs doctrine have permitted parties to rebut this
presumption if the "justified expectations" of those connected with the
corporation warrant application of the forum state's laws.9' Similarly, if
the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation is difficult to determine,
considerations of "certainty"'92 and "ease in determination"93 may warrant
application of the forum state's laws.94 While the Chapman court
acknowledged that the internal affairs doctrine is merely a rebuttable
presumption,95 it applied the doctrine as a bright line rule, failing to
consider the factors that traditionally have been applied to rebut the
presumption in favor of the incorporating jurisdiction's standard.96
The Chapman court's application of the internal affairs doctrine led it to
conclude that, regardless of FIRREA's preservation of state law claims,
federal law governs directors of insolvent federal institutions.9 7 In
searching for the appropriate standard under federal law, the court followed
the Gallagher court's holding8 that section 1821(k)'s gross negligence
standard, rather than any more stringent federal common law, controlled.99
90. The Chapman court explained the internal affairs doctrine and its application to issues of
liability standards as follows:
When the subject is liability of officers and directors for their stewardship of the corporation,
the law presumptively applicable is the law of the place of incorporation. This venerable
choice-of-law principle, known as the internal affairs doctrine, is recognized throughout the
states, and by the Supreme Court as well.
29 F.3d at 1122 (citations omitted); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS
§ 309 (1971).
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 309 (1971) (providing that the
internal affairs doctrine's presumption in favor of the incorporating jurisdiction's laws may be rebutted
by reference to the "justified expectations" of those connected with the corporation).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Several courts have applied such factors to rebut the presumption in favor of the incorporating
junsdiction's laws. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 263-64 (2d Cir. 1984);
Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1959); Ficor, Inc. v.
McHugh, 639 P.2d 385, 391 (Colo. 1982) (en bane).
95. Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122.
96. See id. at 1123. After discussing why the internal affairs doctrine should apply to a federally
chartered institution doing business in a state, the court simply noted that "[s]ecurity held a federal
charter, so national law governs the liability of officers and directors for their management." Id.
97. Id.
98. Two of the three judges deciding Chapman wrote separate opinions expressing their
dissatisfaction with the Gallagher decision, but also noting its precedental weight. Id. at 1125 (Rouner,
J., concurring), 1125-28 (Posner, CJ., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1123. In concluding its search for the relevant federal law to apply, the court noted "[wie
concluded in Gallagher that [§ 1821(k)] adopts gross negligence as the rule for managers and directors
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Accordingly, because the internal affairs doctrine required application of the
gross negligence standard enunciated in FIRREA, the court dismissed the
RTC's state law simple negligence claim."e
Judge Posner dissented from the majority's opinion."0' He argued that
Congress' failure to mention the charter of an institution in FIRREA did
not warrant the court's creation of a new immunity for directors of federal
institutions who would have otherwise been subjected to the negligence
standard of a particular state."0 2 Judge Posner recognized that Congress
designed FIRREA to make directors of failed financial institutions more
susceptible to liability and concluded that the majority opinion diluted the
power of federal regulators in contravention to this purpose."t 3
Judge Posner also concluded that the court misapplied the internal affairs
doctrine." To support his claim, Posner focused on "justified expecta-
of federal financial institutions. We need not devise federal common law; Congress has laid down the
law." Id.
100. Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1124-25.
101. Id. at 1125-28. In addition to Judge Posner's dissent, Judge Rovner wrote a concurring
opinion. Id. at 1125. In her opinion, Judge Rovner expressed sympathy for Judge Posner's analysis but
agreed with Judge Easterbrook that the internal affairs doctrine "compels application of federal law to
the internal affairs of a federally-chartered institution." Id.
102. Id. at 1126. Judge Posner examined the text of FIRREA and noted that Congress did not even
mention the effect a federal charter may have on director liability. Id. Rather than imply from the
congressional silence that federal regulators could only sue directors of federal institutions for gross
negligence, Judge Posner focused on Congress' intent in passing FIRREA and sought to explain
FIRREA's silence. Id. Judge Posner suggested that:
[t]he likeliest reason for the apparent oversight is that there was no history of having to decide
which jurisdiction's law would govern a particular dispute over directors' liability. Directors'
liability had been primarily a common law field; the pertinent common law doctrines (the
business-judgement rule, the duty of loyalty, etc.) had been similar across states and similar
also to the federal common law of directors' liability., . ; and banks and related financial
institutions were invariably local rather than multistate, so potential interstate conflicts in the
obligations of bank directors could not arise. Congress is not gifted with omniscience and
does not have the leisure to be able to tie a pretty ribbon around every piece of legislation,
and so it often either overlooks or chooses not to attempt to solve problems that lack present
salience or urgency. The use by judges of the form of words that Congress has employed to
deal with . . . the problem of states' curtailing the liabilities of directors ... to solve a
problem of which there is no evidence that Congress was even aware is a formula for the
perversion of legislative purpose. We play "Gotcha!" with Congress. We make traps of its
words.
Id.
103. Id. at 1127. In discussing the effect of the majority's opinion, Judge Posner noted that "[w]hat
would otherwise be a more stringent standard, that of simple negligence, is diluted by interpretation of
a statute intended to make the liability of such directors more stringent. The statute has been turned on
its head." Id.
104. Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1126 ("Even if we indulge the fiction that Congress was secretly aware
of the internal-affairs doctrine of corporation law and secretly intended it to apply to suits by the RTC
against federally chartered S & Ls, it does not follow, as the court believes, that the doctrine would bar
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tions," noting that all evidence indicated that those connected with the
institution thought Illinois law would apply to a dispute of this charac-
ter.'°5 Moreover, with regard to the "certainty" considerations that may
also rebut the presumption in favor of the incorporating jurisdiction's
standards, Posner highlighted the confusion surrounding whether FIRREA's
gross negligence standard or a standard existing under federal common law
constituted the appropriate federal law standard."ca According to the
dissent, this confusion justified application of Illinois' more certain simple
negligence provisions." 7
Simply stated, the Chapman holding provides that, regardless of any state
law provisions for simple negligence culpability, directors of failed,
federally chartered institutions may only be sued for gross negligence'05
or conduct evincing a greater disregard of their duty of care. 9 By
rendering an act of Congress subordinate to the internal affairs doctrine
and, in effect, using FIRREA to insulate rather than expose directors of
financial institutions, the Chapman decision marks a disturbing departure
from congressional intent.
the application of Illinois law in this case."). For a case decided after the Chapman decision that
supports Posner's application of the internal affairs doctrine see RTC v. Everhart, 37 F.3d 151 (4th Cir.
1994).
105. 29 F.3d at 1126-27. Judge Posner began his internal affairs analysis by stressing that the
doctrine only creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of application of the law of the incorporating
jurisdiction. Id. He noted that this presumption may be overcome by demonstrating that the "justified
expectations" of those connected with the business warrant application of another jurisdiction's laws.
Id at 1127. Considering the expectations of those involved in the instant case, Judge Posner noted that:
[e]veryone connected with Security would have thought Illinois law applicable to a dispute
of this character. Security had been an Illinois corporation for a century, and nothing in the
text or provision of the statute under which it converted to a federal S & L would have
suggested that the liability of its directors or officers was being altered by the change.
Id
106. Id. ("This case well illustrates the difficulty of determining the rule of decision if federal law,
the law of the chartering jurisdiction, is applied instead of the law of the S & L's principal place of
business."). Id.
107. Id. Because of the possibility that federal common law standards rather than the standard
established in FIRREA constituted the appropriate federal standard, Judge Posner found the federal
standard to be fraught with uncertainty. However, he noted, "[there is no comparable uncertainty about
the contents of the Illinois law of director's liabilities." Id. Based on the relative certainty of the proper
standard under federal and state law, Posner concluded that state law provided the more certain, and
therefore the more proper, standard of liability. Id.
108. See supra text accompanying note 85.
109. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993).
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VI. CHAPMAN'S IMACT
The Chapman court's decision to limit federal regulators' efforts to hold
directors of failed federally chartered financial institution liable for their
actions will affect several aspects of financial institution regulation.
A. Frustrating Intent: Insulating Directors
Congress enacted FIRREA to make it easier for injured parties to sue
directors of failed financial institutions."' Prior to Chapman, a state
could, consistent with FIRREA's purpose, raise the standard of care for
directors to afford its citizens the added protection of a simple negligence
standard."' The Chapman holding creates a uniform standard of liability
for directors of federally chartered institutions and removes a state's power
to impose higher standards of care on directors of such institutions."2
This decision frustrates Congress' purpose of empowering federal regulators
by making it harder to sue directors of institutions in simple negligence
states.' Moreover, it contradicts the language of section 1821(k) that
gives states the authority to enact "other applicable law" that federal
regulators may utilize." 4
In addition to transforming FIRREA into a statute that weakens the
powers of federal regulators, the Chapman holding also places federally
insured deposit funds at risk by creating an incentive for directors to let a
federally chartered institution slip into insolvency." 5 As noted by both
110. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
111. See Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1126 (Posner, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for
"creating a new immunity for directors of federal S & Ls by depriving the RTC of the benefit of state
laws that imposed higher duties on directors.").
112. See id. at 1125 (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting that after Chapman "the RTC must prove gross
negligence, even though Illinois law makes the directors of financial institutions to which its law applies
liable to shareholders for simple negligence.").
113. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
114. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993) ("Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any
right of the [federal regulatory agencies] under other applicable law."). For a discussion of the cases
that have interpreted this section to preserve state law simple negligence actions see supra notes 54-56,
66-67 and accompanying text. See also Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122 (endorsing the opinions of courts
that have held FIRREA not to preempt causes of actions based on state law).
115. Without relying on the charter of the institution, a few state charter cases have recognized that
denying federal regulators access to state law simple negligence claims makes it harder to hold directors
responsible when the institution fails. See, e.g., FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 540-41 (9th cir.
1992); FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 449 (10th Cir. 1992). Clearly this effect contravenes Congress'
intent to curtail activities that placed the federally insured deposit finds at risk. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
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the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, t1 6 under FIRREA, a federal regulator's right
to sue the directors of an institution commences upon the institution's
declaration of insolvency and subsequent entry into receivership." 7
Because the shareholders of an institution doing business in a simple
negligence state may bring actions for simple negligence prior to insolven-
cy," 8 the Chapman court's decision to limit federal regulators to bringing
actions for gross negligence gives directors of federally chartered
institutions the incentive to allow their institutions to become insolvent."1 9
The creation of this perverse incentive frustrates FIRREA's goal of
curtailing activities that threaten the federally insured deposit fund 20
B. High Cost for Uniformity: Impairing a State's Regulatory Powers
Under FIRREA
The propriety of Chapman's holding after Canfield and McSweeney
depends in part on the effect that a federal charter has on the analysis under
FIRREA and the validity of state law claims. 2' By authorizing federal
charters, Congress sought to establish a regulatory regime that would
promote uniformity in banking." Congress vested the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) with authority to regulate all aspects of federal financial
institutions."2 To date, the OTS has not promulgated any regulations
governing the standard of care owed by directors of federally chartered
116. See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
117. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(dX2XA) (Supp. V 1993). Section 1821(d)(2)(A) provides that the federal
regulatory agencies "shall, as conservator or receiver, and by operation of law, succeed to... all rights,
titles, powers, and privileges of the insured depository institution, and of any stockholder, member,
accountholder, depositor, officer, or director of such institution .... Id.
118. See McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 540 ("Before the failure of a thrift and the involvement of federal
regulators, liability would attach for simple negligence.").
119. See Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1123-25. The court held that federal regulators could only sue
directors for gross negligence. Id. By denying federal regulators the right to sue for simple negligence,
the court precludes simple negligence claims only after the institution has gone into receivership. See
supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. Thus, the Chapman decision affords directors greater
protection if the institution is insolvent than if solvent. See id. at 1127. (Posner, J., dissenting).
120. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
121. For a discussion of Canfield and McSweeney see supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
122. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 161 (1982). Congress has
authorized a federal charter system. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (Supp. V 1993). In discussing Congress'
authorization of federal charters, the de la Cuesta court noted that Congress "delegated to the [Office
of Thrift Supervision] broad authority to establish and regulate 'a uniform system of [savings and loan]
institutions ... '." de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 166.
123. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (1995).
Washington University Open Scholarship
1496 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
financial institutions.' 24
In the absence of any applicable regulations, courts have held that
federally chartered institutions are subject to the laws of the state in which
they operate unless those laws conflict with a federal law or impair
congressional objectives."z Thus, whether the directors of an insolvent,
federally chartered institution are subject to state law simple negligence
claims depends first on whether the state law conflicts with section
1821(k).126 Most courts agree that the second sentence of section 1821(k)
constitutes a savings clause, preserving the "other applicable law"' 27 of
states holding directors to the higher standard of simple negligence. 2 8
Based on FIRREA's savings clause, a state's lesser standard of liability
would not conflict with FIRREA.
However, the application of a higher standard of care under state law
could arguably conflict with Congress' goal of promoting uniform banking
standards.'29 Although relying on state law standards of. liability could
certainly create divergent standards throughout the country, FIRREA's
language itself advocates different standards. 3 FIRREA utilizes a gross
negligence standard, but its savings clause preserves the very state law that
could create nonconformity.' Moreover, even without FIRREA's savings
clause, the statute would frustrate uniformity by expressly relying on widely
varying state law definitions of gross negligence.3 2
Congress' goal of uniformity in authorizing federal charters and the
language of section 1821(k) are not necessarily inconsistent. If one reads
section 182 1(k) as setting a uniform minimum standard of liability and only
permitting more stringent deviation by the states, then the statutory
124. See generally id. at §§ 541-84.
125. See, e.g., Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1943) ("[N]ational banks are
subject to state laws, unless those laws infringe the national banking laws.... ."); National State Bank
v. Long, 630 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1980).
126. Analysis under the Supremacy Clause ofthe United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2, would require preemption of state law standards of liability if those standards conflicted with
federal banking law or frustrated the purpose behind federal charters. See EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. AND
JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 67 (3d ed. 1991).
127. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993).
128. See supra notes 48, 55-56, 65, 87 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 33-34.
131. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993). Section 1821(k) provides that "n]othing in this
paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the [federal regulatory agencies] under other applicable
law." Id. For a discussion of cases interpreting this language to preserve state law actions for simple
negligence see supra notes 48, 55-56, 65, 87 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 37, 56 and accompanying text.
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language furthers Congress' purpose of promoting uniformity in the federal
charter context. 133 Thus, consistent with the federal charter provisions, a
uniform minimum standard may exist in harmony with FIRREA's purpose
of protecting the federally insured deposit funds and empowering federal
regulators.
134
Despite the potential for harmonizing the goal of uniformity with those
of section 1821(k), the Chapman court employed the internal affairs
doctrine to favor uniformity at the expense of both the statutory language
of FIRREA and Congress' purposes in enacting it. 31 In effect, the court's
decision signals an unwarranted judicial prioritization. The Chapman court
myopically forced a result consistent with uniformity but ignored the fact
that its decision causes FIRREA to weaken the power of federal regulators
and states.
Ultimately, the Chapman decision affects a state's power to regulate
operations within its jurisdiction by influencing the organizational decisions
of a financial institution. 136 As prior cases make clear, the directors of a
state chartered institution are subject to regulators' claims of state law
negligence. 137 However, Chapman makes equally clear that the directors
of federally chartered institutions are not subject to state simple negligence
standards. 138 To escape state law simple negligence claims, financial
institutions currently organized under state law will likely switch to federal
charters for the added protection offered by the Chapman court. 39 By
inducing institutions to choose federal rather than state charters, the
Chapman decision takes a major step towards stripping states of their
powers to regulate all forms of banking, powers that FIRREA's savings
133. Many courts have held that FIRREA's language and history indicate that Congress only
intended to establish a uniform minimum standard of liability. See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying
text.
134. Indeed, in light of Congress's decision in FIRREA to use state law to define gross negligence,
absolute uniformity, be it maximum or minimum, is not possible. See supra notes 37, 56 and
accompanying text. However, interpreting § 1821(k) to impose a uniform maximum gross negligence
standard of liability on directors of federal institutions has the effect of frustrating Congress' clearly
stated purpose of strengthening the power of federal regulators, see supra note 30 and accompanying
text, and protecting the federally insured deposit fund. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
136. For a thorough discussion of a financial institution's decision to organize with a state or federal
charter see I MALLOY, supra note 24, § 10.2.
137. See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 78-109 and accompanying text.
139. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(o) permits financial institutions to convert from a state to a federal charter
under certain conditions. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(o) (Supp. V 1993).
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clause and our federal system preserve."'
C. The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Further Weakening the States
A state's role in regulating federal institutions is further diminished upon
examining the Chapman court's internal affairs analysis. The court failed
to apply the factors that traditionally rebut the presumption in favor of the
chdlrter jurisdiction's law. 41 While the majority uses this doctrine to
remove failed federal institutions from the reach of state law, Judge
Posner's dissent indicates that these factors militate in favor of state
law.' If FIRREA's language and purpose do not allow application of
state law standards, the Chapman court's application of the internal affairs
doctrine as a bright line rule as opposed to a presumption makes it
impossible for federal regulators to take advantage of a state standard
preserved by FIRREA's savings clause and, therefore, removes a state's
power to regulate failed federal institutions.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the gross negligence standard established in Chapman, FIRREA
favors directors of federally chartered financial institutions doing business
in states permitting actions for simple negligence. While Congress designed
FIRREA to empower those seeking redress, Congress' failure to announce
that FIRREA applies equally to both state and federally chartered
institutions allowed the Chapman court to make it harder to hold those
potentially responsible for the institution's failure accountable. In time,
frustrated congressional intent will prompt clarification of FIRREA's
140. Using FIRREA to attract banks to adopt federal charters appears inconsistent with Congress'
express decision in § 1821(k) to save state law causes of action, see supra notes 42-60, and therefore,
the states' power to regulate. See also 135 CONG. REc. S4278-4279 (daily ed. April 19, 1989)
(expressing federalism concerns and caution about disrupting state law with the enactment of FIRREA).
141. For a discussion of the internal affairs doctrine and how the Chapman court applied the
doctrine, see supra notes 89-100, 104-07 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
143. See Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1125 (Posner, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Posner explained
the court's holding in terms that illustrate the majority's preference for federal regulation over state
regulation despite the savings clause of § 1821(k). Id. Posner stated that:
[tioday we hold that, despite the saving clause, state law is inapplicable. . . , because disputes
involving the internal affairs of a corporation, including the duties of directors to their
shareholders (in whose shoes the RTC stands), are governed by the law of the chartering
jurisdiction, in this case the federal government, and the applicable law of that jurisdiction
is [the gross negligence standard set out in] § 1821(k).
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application to federally chartered institutions. Until such clarification, the
Seventh Circuit has increased the burden on federal regulators regulating
failed federal financial institutions located in simple negligence states while
concomitantly decreasing a state's power to regulate the operations of
federally chartered institutions operating within its borders.
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